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1.1  Introduction 
“Junk” bonds, as they are popularly called, or “high-yield’’ 
bonds, as they are termed by those wishing to avoid pejorative 
connotations,  are simply bonds that are either rated  below 
investment grade or unrated altogether.’ Fueled by the intro- 
duction of newly issued junk bonds in  1977, this segment of 
the bond market has grown rapidly in recent years and now 
accounts for more than 15 percent of public corporate bonds 
outstanding. However, the growth of junk bond financing, par- 
ticularly  in  hostile  takeover  situations,  has  been  bitterly 
denounced. 
For example, Martin Lipton, a merger specialist with the 
firm of  Wachtell,  Lipton, Rosen, and Katz, has argued that 
junk bond financing threatens “the destruction of the fabric 
of American industry” (Williams 1984). In a similar vein, twelve 
U.S. senators signed a letter in support of Federal Reserve 
restrictions on  junk bond-financed  takeovers, that stated, “By 
substituting debt for equity on the balance sheets of the na- 
tion’s corporations, junk bond financing drains financial re- 
sources from productive uses such as economic developmknt 
and job creation”  (Wynter 1985). 
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Why did junk bond financing arise, and how important is 
its influence in the capital markets? Why has it been the target 
of  such acrimony, and how justified  are the charges of  its 
critics? This paper seeks to answer these questions. 
Section  1.2 describes the major forces that have  shaped 
capital market developments generally in recent years. Against 
this backdrop, the growth and current dimensions of the junk 
bond market are traced in section 1.3. It is argued that junk 
bond financing is a natural outgrowth of the same forces that 
have  influenced  the capital  market as a whole. Section  1.4 
reviews both the charges that have been brought against junk 
bonds and the evidence available for assessing those charges, 
and section 1.5 offers conclusions. 
1.2  Forces Underlying Recent Capital Market 
Developments 
The past ten to fifteen years have been ones of highly un- 
certain inflation and interest rate volatility. Since the Federal 
Reserve announced in 1979 that it would pay less attention to 
interest rate levels, the standard deviations of returns on fixed 
income securities have more than doubled  (Ibbotson  1985). 
Changing rates of inflation have contributed to sharp swings 
in the availability of  internal funds relative to total corporate 
financing needs (Taggart 1986). Thus, U.  S. corporations have 
had to move in and out of  the external capital markets more 
frequently in recent years, and they have faced highly uncer- 
tain conditions when doing so. 
In response to these conditions, corporations have placed 
greater emphasis on reducing  the  costs of  raising  external 
funds. They have gone further afield to tap new sources of 
funds, as is illustrated by the growth of  Eurodollar bond fi- 
nancing by U.S.  corporations from $300 million in 1975 to $20 
billion  in  1984 (Kidwell, Marr, and Thompson  1985). Even 
firms with  little  or no overseas  operations,  such  as public 
utilities, have raised funds in this market. Corporations have 
also sought when possible to raise funds directly from inves- 
tors, thus avoiding  the administrative  and regulatory  costs 
implicit  in  borrowing  from financial  intermediaries. This is 
exemplified by the rapid growth of the commercial paper mar- 7  “Junk”  Bond Market’s Role in Financing Takeovers 
ket, in which outstanding paper of nonfinancial corporations 
quadrupled to more than $80 billion between  1978 and 1985. 
As a result, commercial and industrial loans from large banks 
fell from 34 percent of nonfinancial business borrowing in 1978 
to 28 percent in 1985. 
Similarly, changes in investor behavior have been induced 
by more volatile conditions in capital markets. Investors have 
searched for higher-yielding  securities after suffering losses 
from inflation, and they have been more inclined to trade se- 
curities in response to changing economic conditions. Annual 
secondary market trading volume in Treasury bonds, for ex- 
ample, has increased tenfold since 1978 to more than $10 tril- 
lion in  1985 (Frydl 1986). Among financial intermediaries, a 
similar desire for flexibility  has manifested  itself  in  the un- 
buckling of loan origination from investment, as in the growth 
of mortgage-backed securities. 
Recent  years  have  also witnessed  increased  competition 
among financial institutions. Making loans to prime customers 
has become more of a commodity-type business as U.S. banks 
have faced competition both from foreign banks and from the 
commercial paper market.  Banks have thus turned  increas- 
ingly to asset-based financing and other forms of lending to 
lower-grade credits in an attempt to maintain profit margins. 
A similar phenomenon has occurred in investment banking, 
where margins on underwriting bonds for large corporate cus- 
tomers have narrowed, especially since 1982, when the shelf 
registration rule (Rule 415) was adopted. This has in turn led 
to an emphasis on higher-margin activities, such as advising 
on mergers and acquisitions.  Investment bankers have also 
tried to attract customers with innovative securities and trans- 
actions, such as zero coupon bonds and interest rate swaps. 
Competitive upheaval has affected numerous other sectors 
of the U.S. economy as well. The effects of regulatory change, 
foreign competition, volatile commodity prices, and new tech- 
nology have been felt in industries ranging from transportation 
and communication to energy and manufacturing. Mergers and 
divestitures, new investment, and plant closings have led to 
large capital  flows into and out of  these  industries.  In the 
financial markets, these activities have placed a premium on 
the ability to mobilize large amounts of capital quickly. 8  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
In the next section it will be argued that the growth of the 
junk bond market is a product of this same set of forces. It 
should also be noted that the turbulent economic environment 
resulting from these forces has given rise to a host of emotion- 
charged policy issues. These include the debate over “indus- 
trial policy,”  the soundness of  corporate financial practices , 
the stability of financial intermediaries in the face of regulatory 
and competitive change, and the role of mergers and takeovers 
in economic growth. Since the growth of the  junk bond market 
stems from the economic forces that gave rise to these issues, 
it should not be surprising that the market itself has become 
entwined in many of the same issues. 
1.3  Dimensions of the Junk Bond Market 
1.3.1  Growth of the Market 
Prior to 1977, the public junk bond market consisted almost 
entirely of “fallen angels,” or bonds whose initial investment 
grade ratings  were  subsequently lowered.  As the first  two 
columns of table 1.1 show, fallen angels accounted for about 
5 percent, on average, of U.S. corporations’ public straight 
debt outstanding between the beginning of  1970 and the end 
of  1976. 
The market began to change in 1977, when bonds that were 
rated below investment grade from the start were first issued 
in significant quantities. Although Lehman Brothers is cred- 
ited with having underwritten the first such issue (Institutional 
Investor  1985), Drexel  Burnham  Lambert turned  this inno- 
vation into a major business thrust and quickly became the 
market leader.2 
The economic conditions described in the preceding section 
were conducive to increased acceptance of junk bonds at this 
time.  For example, investors’ search for higher-yielding  se- 
curities had already enhanced interest in lower-grade bonds, 
so new issues offered a way to satisfy this demand. 
At  the same time, the  changing industrial  structure was 
stimulating  the growth  of  a number  of  medium-sized  firms 
whose lack of credit history prevented them from qualifying 
for investment grade bond  ratings.  Junk bonds afforded  such 9  “Junk”  Bond Market’s Role in Financing Takeovers 
Table 1.1  Outstanding Debt of  U.S. Corporations (billions of dollars) 
Total Public  Public  (2) as %  Total  (2) as % 
Straight  Straight  of (1)  Corporate  of (4) 
Bondsa  Junk Bonds”  Bondsb 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1985  410.0  59.1  14.5  653.7  9.0 
1984  371.1  41.7  11.2  568.9  7.3 
1983  339.9  28.2  8.3  518.0  5.4 
1982  320.9  18.5  5.8  487.4  3.8 
1981  303.8  17.4  5.7  458.6  3.8 
1980  282.0  15.1  5.4  431.7  3.5 
1979  245.0  9.4  3.8  370.8  2.5 
1978  245.0  9.4  3.8  370.8  2.5 
1977  228.5  8.5  3.7  333.1  2.6 
1976  209.9  8.0  3.8  304.4  2.6 
1975  187.9  7.7  4.1  277.7  2.7 
1974  167.0  11.1  6.6  251.9  4.4 
1973  154.8  8.1  5.2  233.2  3.5 
1972  145.7  7.1  4.9  219.1  3.2 
1971  132.5  6.6  5.0  200.2  3.3 
1970  116.2  7.0  6.0  176.5  4.0 
“Measured as of June 30 for each year.  Source: Altmdn and Narnrnacher (1985b, 
1986). 
bAverage of  beginning and ending years’ figures. Source: Board of  Governors of 
Federal Reserve System. 
firms direct access to investors and thus provided  a poten- 
tially  lower-cost  alternative to borrowing  through  financial 
intermediaries. 
In investment banking, the competitive pressures described 
in the preceding section were already eroding the profitability 
of high-grade bond underwriting, so firms in the industry had 
become increasingly receptive to new market segments. Since 
only 6 percent of  the roughly  11,000 public corporations in 
the United States qualify for investment grade ratings (Paulus 
1986),  junk bond underwriting appeared to offer a higher-mar- 
gin business with potential for growth. Hence the development 
of the junk bond business in investment banking may be seen 
as analogous to commercial banks’ pursuit of nonprime cus- 
tomers in an attempt to maintain profitability. 
Newly issued junk bonds were an especially attractive busi- 
ness opportunity for Drexel Burnham, which had little estab- 
lished position in the higher-quality  segment of bond under- 10  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
writing and few competitive advantages on which it could build 
such a position. It did, however, have an established junk bond 
trading operation, which Michael Milken had been developing 
since the early 1970s. Drexel Burnham had already established 
a network of potential investors and the capability to serve as 
a secondary market-maker;  together, these were key contrib- 
uting factors to its dominance of junk bond underwriting. Is- 
suers saw Drexel’s investor network as giving it almost a unique 
ability  to mobilize large  amounts of  capital  quickly,  while 
investors found junk bonds  far more  attractive when  they 
could be resold in a liquid secondary market.3 
It can be argued, in fact, that much of what was innovative 
about newly issued junk bonds was the ability to trade them. 
As Jensen (1986) has pointed out, junk bonds can be thought 
of  as term loans that have been packaged to enhance their 
liquidity and divisibility. They are thus a substitute for bank 
loans and private placements, which the original lenders typ- 
ically hold until maturity. In this light, the development of the 
junk bond market is analogous to the securitization process 
that has taken place in the mortgage market. 
Table 1.2 documents the growth of the new issue portion of 
the junk bond market since 1977. Most new issues are unse- 
cured public straight debt with typical maturities in the ten- to 
Table 1.2  Yearly Public Issues of Corporate Debt (billions of dollars) 
Total Public Bond 
Issues by US.  Straight Junk  (2) as % 
Public Issues of 
Corporationsa  Bondsb  of (1) 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3) 
1986 (1st half)  114.3  15.8  13.8 
1985  120.0  19.8  16.5 
1984  73.6  15.8  21.4 
1983  47.6  8.5  17.8 
1982  44.3  3.2  7.2 
1981  38.1  1.7  4.6 
1980  41.6  2.1  5.0 
1979  25.8  1.7  6.5 
1978  19.8  2.1  10.8 
1977  24.1  1.1  4.6 
a1986 figure from Investment  Dealer’s Digest. Figures  for  1977-85  from Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. 
b1986 figure from Investment Dealer’s Digest. Figures for 1977-85  from Drexel Burn- 
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fifteen-year range.4 Since 1983, junk bonds of this type have 
averaged nearly 17 percent of total (convertible plus straight) 
public bond issues by U.S. corporations. Largely as a result 
of the increase in new issues, the share of junk bonds in total 
corporate bonds outstanding has also grown substantially. The 
market’s rapid growth, in fact, is reflected in the continually 
increasing estimates of its size. According to a Morgan Stanley 
estimate (Altman and Nammacher  1986) shown in table 1.1, 
straight public junk bonds outstanding amounted to $59.1 bil- 
lion in mid-1985. This represents over 14 percent of straight 
public corporate debt and 9 percent of total corporate bonds 
outstanding. Drexel Burnham (1986) provides an estimate of 
$82 billion in junk bonds by year-end 1985, which represents 
19.1 percent of  year-end public  straight debt and nearly  12 
percent of total corporate bonds outstanding at the end of the 
year. When convertibles and private placements with regis- 
tration  rights  are also included, the share of junk bonds is 
slightly higher.5 Finally, Morgan Stanley’s data indicate that, 
as a result of both new issues and bond downgrades, public 
junk bonds outstanding had grown to $92.9 billion by June 30, 
1986. 
1.3.2  Investors 
Financial institutions are the primary investors in junk bonds; 
Drexel Burnham estimates their total holdings to be between 
80 and 90 percent. This represents between $45 and $84 billion 
in total holdings, depending on the date on which total junk 
bonds outstanding are estimated. Within the financial insti- 
tutions category, approximately $5.5 billion (or 7 percent of 
outstanding junk bonds) was held by savings and loan asso- 
ciations, including their unconsolidated but wholly owned sub- 
sidiaries at year-end 1985.6  There were also forty high-yield 
bond  mutual funds by the end of  1985, with total assets of 
approximately  $12  billion  (about  15 percent  of  outstanding 
junk bonds). This had grown to forty-five funds with nearly 
$21 billion in assets by mid-1986. However, the assets of these 
funds were not  invested exclusively in junk bonds (Altman 
and Nammacher  1985b, 1986). Other institutional holders of 
junk bonds include pension funds, insurance companies, com- 
mercial banks, and investment banking firms. 12  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
1.3.3  Junk Bond Returns and Risk 
As one would expect, junk bonds experience more defaults 
than investment grade bonds, but as a group, they also tend 
to have higher  returns.  For the period  1974-85,  the annual 
default rate on rated junk bonds averaged 1.53 percent, com- 
pared  with  0.09  percent  for all  rated  public  straight  bonds 
(Altman and Nammacher 1986).’ During 1985 the default rate 
for junk bonds (1.68 percent) was slightly higher than its pre- 
vious average, but at the same time the default rate for all 
bonds  (0.23 percent) was substantially  higher  than average. 
For the first  six months of  1986, the rate for junk bonds in- 
creased again to about 3 percent. 
Although differences in returns are sensitive to the period 
chosen, junk bond returns have generally compared favorably 
with those of higher-grade bonds. For the period 1978-85,  for 
example, Altman and Nammacher (1986) calculated  a com- 
pound  annual rate of  return of  12.4 percent for junk bonds 
compared with 9.7 percent for the Shearson Lehman Long- 
Term Government Bond Index. For the period  1976-85,  the 
average total reinvested return for high-yield mutual funds was 
206.8 percent, compared with  178.0 percent for U.S. govern- 
ment  bond  funds.  Using  internal  worksheets  from  market- 
makers, Blume and Keim (1984) constructed their own index 
of  junk  bond  returns  and  found  an annualized  compound 
monthly rate of return of 20.3 percent for the period January 
1982 to May 1984, compared with 15.0 percent for a portfolio 
of AAA-rated bonds. For the same period, they also found a 
positive (though not quite statistically significant) “alpha,”  or 
risk-adjusted excess rate of return of 0.61 percent, compared 
with 0.24 percent for AAA bonds.* It would be unjustified, of 
course, to extrapolate any of  these specific return spreads to 
future periods, but there is substantial evidence that portfolios 
of junk bonds  have  performed  relatively  well  in  the recent 
past. 
1.3.4 
By far the most controversial use of junk bonds has been 
in leveraged buyouts and takeovers. Drexel Burnham began 
selling junk bonds to finance leveraged buyouts in  198  1, and 
in 1983 the firm conceived the idea of using junk bond financing 
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commitments in  connection  with  hostile  takeovers.  Again, 
Drexel’s trading capability and investor network, which gave 
it the ability to raise large amounts of funds on relatively short 
notice,  made acquisition  activity  a natural extension  of  its 
existing business. In particular, it had already established trad- 
ing relationships with a number of so-called corporate raiders, 
including the Belzberg family, Carl Lindner, and Saul Steinberg 
(Bianco 1985). 
Although a variety of financing structures have been used, the 
one attracting the most attention was that in which a potential 
acquirer,  backed  by financing commitments from investors, 
makes a tender offer for some fraction of the target company’s 
shares. The commitments represent the investors’ promise to 
purchase some amount of junk bonds or other securities, pro- 
vided  that the specified fraction of  shares is tendered under 
the terms of  the offer. The securities may be issued through 
a shell corporation, set up specifically for the purpose of ac- 
quiring the target’s shares, but they are not explicitly collater- 
alized by those shares. If the tender offer succeeds, the target 
company’s assets can then be used as collateral for any ad- 
ditional loans needed to complete the acquisition. Whether or 
not the offer succeeds, the investors receive commitment fees 
ranging from 3/8 percent to I  percent of the funds committed 
(Bleakley 1985). 
From the acquirer’s standpoint, the principal advantage of 
this structure is speed. Delays are felt to favor the target com- 
pany in a hostile takeover attempt, and except for large ac- 
quirers, raising  the needed  funds can often be a source of 
delay. By relying on its established investor network, however, 
Drexel Burnham found that it could obtain sizable financing 
commitments in a relatively short period.  This in  turn con- 
siderably enhanced the ability of an acquirer to attempt the 
takeover even of a much larger target. Of course, investors’ 
willingness to make these commitments on short notice de- 
pended on a good relationship with Drexel Burnham, based 
on successful investments in previous dealings with the firm. 
As long as this relationship could be maintained, though, Drexel 
Burnham was able to raise capital quickly. 
Not surprisingly, the increased ability  of  “raiders”  to at- 
tempt the takeover of even very large companies aroused an- 14  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
ger and suspicion in a number of quarters, and several bills 
were introduced in Congress aimed at curbing junk bond fi- 
nancing of takeovers. Some critics were especially disturbed 
that a small number of large investors appeared to be taking 
turns financing one another in takeover raids.9 
To  date, however, the only legislative or regulatory action 
taken against junk bonds has been by  the Federal Reserve 
Board. Despite the fact that junk bonds issued in takeovers 
are not explicitly collateralized  by the  shares of  the target 
company, the Fed voted in January 1986 to apply margin reg- 
ulations to stock purchases by shell corporations. The ruling 
stipulated numerous exceptions, however, and thus made it 
clear that it was aimed directly at hostile takeovers using the 
shell financing structure just described.I0 
While it is clear that junk bonds have sparked heated con- 
troversy, it  is less clear how important their actual role  in 
financing acquisitions has been. Estimates of the amount of 
junk bond financing used in acquisitions  differ widely but a 
range of possibilities can be established. 
Drexel Burnham (1985), for example, estimates that in 1984, 
about $1.7 billion in publicly issued junk bonds was associated 
with acquisitions and leveraged buyouts. This represents about 
11 percent of total public junk bond issues for the year and 
about  1.4 percent of  the total  1984 value of merger and ac- 
quisition activity."  Of this amount, Drexel Burnham estimates 
that $0.6 billion, or 4 percent of 1984's total public junk bond 
issues, was associated with hostile takeovers. A very prelim- 
inary Drexel Burnham estimate (reported in Jensen 1986) in- 
dicates that during 1985, junk bond acquisition financing may 
have risen to $3.8 billion, which represents 19 percent of total 
public junk bond issues for the year and 2.7 percent of total 
merger financing. 
The Federal Reserve Board, by contrast, estimates that $6.5 
billion,  or 41  percent  of  1984's total junk bond  issues, was 
related to mergers or acquisitions in some way (Martin 1985). 
In addition, it estimates that $4.3 billion  in privately  placed 
junk bonds was merger related, so that $10.8 billion in all, or 
about 9 percent of 1984's total merger and acquisition activity, 
was financed with junk bonds.12 15  “Junk”  Bond Market’s Role in Financing Takeovers 
Finally, Morgan Stanley gives an intermediate figure, esti- 
mating that junk bond financing of acquisitions and leveraged 
buyouts came to about $3.3 billion in 1984 and $6.2 billion in 
1985 (Paulus 1986). This represents 21 percent and 31 percent, 
respectively, of total junk bond issues for those years. It also 
represents 2.6 percent and 4.5  percent, respectively,  of  the 
total value of merger activity for 1984 and 1985. 
1.3.5  Conclusions about the Size of the Market 
The inconsistencies in the figures cited above make it clear 
that the dimensions of the junk bond market are hard to de- 
termine  precisely.  Nevertheless,  some  general  conclusions 
seem warranted. 
First, the growth of the market has been impressive. Par- 
ticularly since 1982, the share ofjunk bonds in both new issues 
and total corporate bonds outstanding has increased sharply. 
There can be  no  doubt that junk  bonds  now  represent  an 
important segment of the corporate bond market. 
Second, while the importance of junk bonds must be con- 
ceded, it should also be recognized that they hardly threaten 
to overwhelm the market. The data in table 1.2, for example, 
do not  give strong grounds for predicting that junk bonds’ 
market  share will  experience further rapid increases in  the 
immediate future. 
Third, the role of junk bond  financing in mergers and ac- 
quisitions must likewise be seen as significant, but not pre- 
dominant. By any set of estimates, only a small part of the 
value of junk bonds issued is used for acquisitions. The rest 
is used to finance ongoing business operations. In addition, 
merger-related junk bond issues represent only a small fraction 
of total merger and acquisition activity. 
1.4  Policy Issues Surrounding the Junk Bond Market 
It has been argued in preceding sections that uncertain in- 
flation and interest rate volatility, increased competition in the 
financial services industry, and the process of corporate re- 
structuring have all contributed to the growth of the  junk bond 
market. These forces have also produced a turbulent economic 16  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
environment, which has spurred policy debates about the level 
of debt in the economy, the stability of financial institutions, 
and the fairness and efficiency of the corporate takeover pro- 
cess. It is not  surprising that  the growth of  the junk bond 
market,  a  product  of  the  same economic forces, has been 
accompanied by the same policy debates. However, just as it 
would be implausible to argue that the junk bond market has 
itself  been  a root cause of  interest  rate volatility,  financial 
services competition, and corporate restructuring, it would be 
equally implausible to argue that junk bonds have been fun- 
damentally responsible for the perceived ills described in these 
policy debates. Let us consider several of these policy issues 
in turn. 
1.4.1  Is There Too Much Debt in the U.S. Financial 
System? 
There may be. If there is, however, it would be difficult to 
argue that the corporate sector is primarily responsible. It is 
true that there has been a fairly steady increase in recent years 
in corporate debt-equity ratios measured in book value terms. 
When measured in market value terms, by contrast, adjusting 
for inflation and for changes in the perceived ability of assets 
to generate cash, the debt-equity ratio  has decreased  sub- 
stantially since 1974. In 1985, for example, the estimated mar- 
ket  value  debt-equity ratio for U.S. corporations  was  .37, 
compared with .61 in 1974 and an average of .46 for the period 
1975-84. l3 
Moreover, as indicated in table 1.1, junk bonds do not ac- 
count for a major fraction of  total corporate debt.  Since at 
least some portion of newly issued junk bonds are presumably 
a substitute for bank borrowing  or private placements  that 
corporations would otherwise have made, it is especially hard 
to argue that junk bonds have exerted any substantial upward 
influence on the overall corporate debt-equity ratio. Fears about 
the overall level of debt have been used to rationalize restric- 
tions on the use of junk bonds in takeovers  (Schultz 1985), 
such as the imposition of margin regulations by the Federal 
Reserve Board. Since takeovers account for only a small frac- 
tion of even total junk bond financing, such restrictions could 
hardly have much effect on total corporate debt. 17  “Junk”  Bond Market’s Role in Financing Takeovers 
1.4.2  Does Merger Activity Contribute to Increased 
Corporate Debt? 
Available  evidence indicates that  this is not  the case.  A 
study by  Becketti (1986), for example, found no statistical 
linkage between the value of merger activity in immediately 
preceding years and the total current level of domestic non- 
financial debt.  But even if  one disputes  this  evidence,  the 
amount of junk bond merger financing is so small relative to 
total merger activity, as indicated in section 1.3.5, that junk 
bonds could  not  have  made much of  a contribution to any 
merger-induced increase in total debt. 
1.4.3  Are Takeovers and Their Associated Tactics Harmful 
to the Economy? 
This question has been widely  debated,  and a complete 
discussion is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. The point 
is, though, that this issue is also far beyond the scope of the 
junk bond market. Corporate raiders, greenmail and break-up 
acquisitions, or “asset-stripping,”  have  all been blamed  to 
some degree on  junk bond financing.  l4  But while it is true that 
junk bond financing has facilitated hostile takeover bids by 
enabling potential  acquirers to raise capital  quickly,  hostile 
takeovers existed long before the introduction of junk bond 
financing and would continue to exist even if  the junk bond 
market  were  heavily  curtailed  by  regulation  or legislation. 
Moreover, there would appear to be no more compelling rea- 
sons to pay greenmail to a junk bond financed raider than to 
a raider financed  by  some other means.  In the same vein, 
breaking up assets makes economic sense only when they are 
perceived to be worth more separately than together, whether 
or not the assets have been financed with junk bonds. 
1.4.4  Do Junk Bond Holdings by Financial Institutions 
Pose a Threat to the Deposit Insurance Agencies? 
The fear here is that savings and loans, in particular, have 
abused their new diversification power by purchasing excep- 
tionally  risky  assets.  In so doing,  it is  charged, they  have 
shifted  risk  to  the  Federal  Savings  and  Loan  Insurance 
Corporation. 18  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
In the broadest sense, this fear does not appear to be war- 
ranted. Federally chartered S&Ls are currently allowed to hold 
1 percent of their assets in unrated bonds. Their 10 percent 
commercial lending authority may also be used to purchase junk 
bonds,  giving  total  allowed  holdings  of  11 percent.  State- 
chartered S&Ls in some states may devote larger fractions of 
their assets to junk bonds. In the aggregate, however, the Fed- 
eral Home Loan Bank Board estimates the S&Ls held, on av- 
erage, a total of $5.5 billion in junk bonds during 1985.15  This 
represents approximately one-half of 1 percent of the total as- 
sets of FSLIC-insured institutions, and thus junk bonds would 
not appear to pose a system-wide threat to the FSLIC. 
Nevertheless, it is true that junk bond holdings  are very 
concentrated among the nation’s S&Ls. For example, as of 
June 1985, ten S&Ls (out of 3,180 FSLIC-insured institutions) 
held $4.64 billion in junk bonds. This accounts for 77 percent 
of total junk bond holdings by S&Ls during that month and 
represents about 10 percent of total assets by those ten insti- 
tutions. Five of these institutions are located in California and 
three in Texas, states that have more liberal asset composition 
regulations for state-chartered  S&Ls. Furthermore, a single 
institution, Columbia Saving and Loan Association of Beverly 
Hills, California, held approximately $1 billion in junk bonds 
at this time, and by June 30,  1986, it had increased its junk 
bond holdings to $2.3 billion, or 28 percent of its total assets 
(Hilder 1986). 
It is possible, then, that junk bonds could pose a problem 
for the FSLIC, albeit a problem confined to a relatively small 
number of institutions. But as in the debates discussed above, 
the issue is really much broader than the junk bond  market 
itself. There is a host of risky financial practices in which S&Ls 
or other depository institutions might engage. It has yet to be 
demonstrated  that junk bonds are significantly riskier  than 
many other investments, such as construction loans or finan- 
cial futures positions, and junk bond losses have not been a 
contributing factor in S&L failures to date. The FSLIC may 
indeed  need  to improve its procedures  for monitoring  and 
assessing S&L risk and for pricing deposit insurance, but junk 
bonds appear to be a small part of this overall problem. 19  “Junk”  Bond Market’s Role in Financing Takeovers 
1.4.5  Does Junk Bond Issuance Harm Other Bondholders? 
The corporate restructuring phenomenon has increased le- 
verage for a number of firms. This has come about through 
mergers, leveraged buyouts, and stock repurchases. In addi- 
tion, many firms have altered the overall riskiness of their as- 
sets through acquisitions and divestitures. As a result of such 
transactions, the outstanding debt of a number of firms has 
been downgraded, and bondholders have suffered losses.  l6 To 
the extent that newly issued junk bonds have been involved 
in  restructuring transactions,  they  have shared some of  the 
blame for these losses and some see the problem of bond- 
holder expropriation as an important legal issue (McDaniel 
1986). 
There is little reason to suppose, though, that transferring 
wealth from bondholders is a primary motivation for issuing 
junk bonds.  Firms  could  not  impose  extensive  damage on 
existing bondholders without severely penalizing the terms on 
which they could raise funds in the future. Empirical studies 
also suggest that, while restructuring transactions are bene- 
ficial to shareholders, they do not, on average, cause signifi- 
cant losses for bondholders.  l7 
There can be no doubt, of course, that bondholders have 
experienced  significant  losses in individual cases.  l8 The re- 
structuring phenomenon reflects a period of upheaval that was 
not widely anticipated, either by management or investors, at 
the time many outstanding bonds were issued. Thus, in ret- 
rospect, some investors have found themselves inadequately 
protected. In response, both investors and management have 
sought new protective mechanisms so as to make future bond 
issues more attractive. Several issues of “poison put”  bonds 
have been made, for example, which allow holders to turn in 
their bonds for cash or stock in the event of a change in control 
of the issuing company (Hertzberg 1986). Similar provisions 
in some recent private placements allow loans to be called if 
a major restructuring occurs (Picker 1986). While restructuring 
transactions  may  pose  difficult  problems of  negotiation  be- 
tween bondholders and firms,  however,  it  is not clear that 
additional legislative or regulatory action is called for. 20  Robert A. Taggart, Jr. 
1.5  Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to assess the size and influence 
of the junk bond market. Newly issued junk bonds represent 
a significant  financial innovation.  Spawned by the forces of 
interest rate volatility, competition in financial services, and 
industrial restructuring, they have tapped a significant pocket 
of investor demand, thereby allowing many corporations to 
raise funds more quickly and on better terms than would oth- 
erwise have been available. 
At the same time, the significance that junk bonds have been 
accorded in policy debates appears to stem more from their 
symbolic value than their real influence. The mere mention of 
their  label  can conjure up visions of  corporate raiders and 
heavy debt burdens. But regardless of one’s position on the 
larger policy issues, actions directed at the junk bond market 
by itself seem unlikely to have a radical impact on the aggre- 
gate level of debt, the amount of  corporate restructuring ac- 
tivity, or the safety of the financial system. 
Notes 
I am grateful to Richard Pickering of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s 
Office of Policy and Economic Research, Eric H. Siber of Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, Inc., and Richard S. Wilson of Merrill Lynch Capital Markets for 
providing helpful information. They bear no responsibility, however, for any 
errors this paper may contain. 
Under Moody’s rating system, therefore, junk bonds are those rated 
Ba or lower, while under Standard & Poor’s, they are defined  as BB or 
lower. For ease of expression, the more common term, “junk”  bonds, will 
be used throughout the paper, but no derogatory implications are intended 
by that usage. 
Drexel Burnham’s dominance is illustrated by the fact that it served 
as lead manager for 56 percent of the value of total public junk bond issues 
during the period 1978-85  (Altman and Nammacher 1986). 
Secondary trading volume  in junk bonds is apparently substantial 
relative to other types of corporate bonds. G. Chris Anderson of Drexel 
Burnham has estimated that annual secondary market trading volume cur- 
rently amounts to $240 billion (Reich 1986). This is about 20 percent of the 
annual dollar trading volume for New York Stock Exchange stocks. 
The average years to maturity (ignoring sinking funds) of new junk 
bond issues fell from nineteen years in 1978 to eleven years in 1985 (Altman 
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to those found on other corporate bonds, although very recently a few junk 
bond issues have contained  “net worth” clauses, stipulating that some or 
all of the issue must be called at par if  the issuer’s net worth falls below a 
certain level. In general, however, junk bonds tend to  carry fewer restrictive 
covenants than investment grade bonds. 
Private placements with registration rights are issues that are initially 
privately placed, but that give the original investors the right to have the 
issue registered for public trading at some future point. Such issues might 
be used, for example, in situations in which a need to raise funds quickly 
favors a private placement, but in which the initial investor would ultimately 
like to be able to trade his bonds in the public market. 
This  information  was provided  by  the Federal  Home  Loan  Bank 
Board’s Office of Policy and Economic Research. The implications of S&L 
holdings of junk bonds will be discussed further in section  1.4. 
The default rate is measured as the par value of bonds of a given type 
that default  during a year, divided by  the par value of  total outstanding 
bonds of that type for the year.  Since investors do not lose the entire par 
value of their investment in a default, it should be noted that this rate may 
considerably overstate actual investor losses. 
Perhaps surprisingly,  Blume and Keim also found a lower monthly 
standard deviation of returns (2.74 percent) for  junk bonds during this period 
than for AAA bonds (3.59 percent).  It should be noted, however, that the 
characteristics (call provisions, duration, etc.) of the two samples were not 
matched and that this was a relatively short period. 
For example, Bleakley (1985) reports that of $3.1 billion in junk bond 
financing commitments for  five  takeover attempts  (three of  which  were 
ultimately  successful) during  1984 and  1985, $1.2 billion in commitments 
came from just eight investors. Moreover, four of the eight (the Belzberg 
family, Nelson Peltz of Triangle Industries, Saul Steinberg of Reliance Group, 
and Stephen Wynn of Golden Nugget), who together made $643 million in 
commitments, were themselves regarded as raiders. 
Specifically, the Fed stated that margin rules would not apply under 
any of the following conditions: (1) the acquiring company has substantial 
assets or cash flow apart from the shares of the target; (2) the parent com- 
pany guarantees the debt of the shell acquisition corporation; (3) there is a 
merger agreement between the acquirer and the target; (4) debt securities 
are offered to the public; (5) financing commitments are contingent on the 
shell corporation’s acquisition of  sufficient  shares to complete a  merger, 
under state laws, without  the approval of the target’s  shareholders or di- 
rectors (Langley and Williams 1986). 
Figures on total merger activity are taken from the May-June  1986 
issue of Mergers and Acquisitions magazine. 
The Congressional  Research Service (Winch and  Brancato  1985) 
estimates that about $1.7 billion in junk bond financing was associated with 
leveraged buyouts during 1984. This also represents about 9 percent of the 
total  1984 value of leveraged buyouts. 
These figures were estimated using the technique described in Tag- 
gart (1985). The Federal Reserve Board, using a different technique, has 
produced  estimates that are numerically  higher (Martin 1985). However, 
the same qualitative conclusions about the debt-equity ratio’s pattern over 
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14.  As an example of the latter, Rohatyn (1985) asserts, “Whether large 
corporations can be treated like artichokes and simply torn apart without 
any regard for employees, communities, or  customers solely in order to pay 
off speculative debt is a further question for public policy.” 
This figure includes junk bonds held by unconsolidated but wholly 
owned S&L  subsidiaries, so it exaggerates somewhat the  junk bond holdings 
of S&L parent companies. 
For example, Moody’s downgraded corporate bonds having a total 
par value of $107.5 billion during 1985, or about 16 percent of the total par 
value of corporate bonds outstanding. Bonds having a par value of  $40.8 
billion, or 38 percent of the value of downgrades, were downgraded as a 
result of restructuring transactions (Goldberg 1986). 
Studies of this issue include Dann (1981) on stock repurchases, Den- 
nis and McConnell(1986)  on mergers, and Hite and Owers (1983) and Schip- 
per and Smith (1983) on spin-offs.  A study of the formation of captive finance 
subsidiaries by Kim, McConnell, and Greenwood (1977) did present some 
evidence of  significant bondholder losses but  a more recent study of  the 
same phenomenon by Malitz (1986) does not confirm that finding. None of 
these studies, however, include the most recent round of corporate restruc- 
turing transactions. 
For evidence of such losses see Alexander, Benson, and Gunderson 
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